The emerging situation in Burma

By B. K Sen, Mizzima News (www.mizzima.com)

February 7, 2004

Burma, onetime in the headlines of the international media, had passed into limbo. Now it is returning to international attention. Burma participated in a meeting of ten countries, including Japan, Thailand, China, India, Australia, Germany, France, Italy held on 15th January 2004 at the initiative of Thailand's Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The sole agenda of the meeting was political reform in Burma.

The Foreign Minister of Burma himself attended the meeting to unfurl the principles of junta's Roadmap for political reform. His personal appearance was taken as proof of the military's sincerity for change. The backdrop of this meeting was an earlier ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Cambodia.

At that meeting, the ASEAN foreign ministers unexpectedly passed a unanimous resolution urging the Burmese government to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, icon of the Burma democracy movement, and to initiate political reforms. Until now, ASEAN has been consistently refused to take any stance considered to amount to internal interference. Now, for the first time, it has taken this step.

Supporting this move was a statement released by the US State Department Secretary. As late as January 31, the US Assistant Secretary of State, said the roadmap showed some movement but Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD must be part of the National Convention. The US wants annual meetings with ASEAN now that the group has started to officially dialogue with China, India and Japan. It appears that the issue of political reform in Burma has been internationalized; now euphemistically called "the Bangkok
Process."

All these events suggest a change in the equation of power between Burma's junta and the international community and a major shift in the tactical policy of the junta - though their main goal of remaining in power is unchanged. Cynics say that the roadmap is a hypocritical show by the junta to appease the international community, to ease the pressure of sanctions and to lure investors to engage in Burma's economic development. That this was a maneuver to split the international community and the junta's paramount consideration continues to be that it retains power.

If that is the situation internationally, the situation internally, it is said, has much improved in favor of the junta. The last major armed group, the Karen National Union (KNU) has entered into talks with the junta and has already agreed to a verbal cease-fire. This has created further confusion in the context of earlier cease-fires entered into by 16 armed resistance groups. Practically, there is no ethnic group left to resist the junta. Daw Suu and the NLD, committed to non-violence, can do little as the entire leadership is imprisoned and the offices are closed. There is no spark of any resistance by at the grass roots level anywhere. With the backdrop of international division and internal 'peace', the junta took the golden opportunity to capitalize on the situation and floated its own political reform roadmap.

The recent Bangkok meeting is part of this same game. The important point is that a major shift has taken place in the junta's maneuvering capacity. Even assuming that the roadmap is to hoodwink the outside world concerning its hidden agenda, the hard fact remains that the junta has condescended to 'sit in the dock', so to speak, in the presence of international community which is to be its jury. The people of Burma, will of course, become the judge.

The NLD and the Junta's Roadmap

The main issue confronting the junta's roadmap to democracy is to give proper space to the NLD. The first step in the roadmap is to reconvene the National Convention to further proceed on the grounds of the 104 principles for drawing a new constitution what have allegedly been accepted. It was these 104 principles that were the bone of contention when the NLD, the outright winner of the 1990 general election, walked out of the National Convention in 1995. The irony is that, through the 1990 elections, the junta gave legitimacy to the NLD to be the key player in Burma's political transition. The United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD), representing the ethnic nationalities, is the other important player. Therefore any agenda for transition stipulated in the roadmap has to be prepared, through invitation and consultation, to cooperate with these elected leaders who constituted a significant part of the National Convention.

The junta rightly began talks and confidence building with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in late 2000. Surprisingly, in the midst of the talks, which had been in process for 2 years, without declaring the talks terminated and against all protocols, the junta conspired with its political arm, the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), to eliminate the NLD leaders in the Depayin massacre on 30 May 2003.

Months have passed since the massacre and, contrary to the junta's press statement, still no action has been taken against those who committed this crime. Nor has any information been given to the public. Even the UN has asked for a public enquiry. On the contrary, as a consequence of the failed conspiracy, all the NLD leaders have been put behind bars. The junta had a great opportunity to come clean about what happened. However, the more the junta tries to cover up its role as the conspirators of the massacre, the more suspicion is confirmed. The roadmap has to move through this mist of suspicion and long fortified mistrust. Friends of democracy for Burma have to bear in mind the fall out of this episode creating a specter of fear pervading the whole country. In this context, confidence building is the key to giving legitimacy and transparency to the crucial stages
of the transition - this roadmap or any other.

Confidence Building

The first step to build confidence with the political opposition and the people of Burma regarding political transition is to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. Unfortunately for the junta, she has become the symbol of resistance to authoritarianism and an icon of the democracy movement in Burma. It is nonsense to say that she is currently free. Even social visitors are not allowed to see her even though it is true that
she recently underwent a major operation.

Daw Suu's release must be followed up by the release of all political prisoners to enable Daw Suu and the NLD to discuss and debate the junta's roadmap and submit the NLD's suggestions for the transitional process. For this to occur, all NLD offices must be permitted to operate. It is also necessary that the UNLD and other ethnic leaders participate in the national debate to lay the democratic foundations of the country. Those in exile also have to be accommodated in the process. The assembly of the people partaking in the National Convention must be all-inclusive. The third step is to suspend certain military degrees that outlaw the National Convention and related activities such as the State Protection law, the Printers and Publishers Act, and Law No. 5/96. To restore normalcy and create an environment where the merits of the roadmap can be openly discussed, alternative suggestions given or amendments made, the above two steps must be taken.

Ambiguity

Despite the roadmap's ambiguity, moves towards transition are welcome. Some movement has been made by the junta to give up the rigidity it has maintained for four decades. The democracy movement is also ready for a positive move. However, its voice is gagged as presently it is not possible to make known its views to the people of Burma who are the fulcrum of the new constitution. In all probability, the two-year talks between the junta and Daw Suu have failed. It does not matter. In the context of the junta having lifted its veil with the roadmap, the democracy movement is prepared to consider the merits of the roadmap and suggest positive alternatives.

But the democracy movement has to be given a level playing ground so that all key players in the transition can take an honorable place in political debate, bringing transparency to political processes so that the country can be brought out of its ruins. To this end, questions of ambiguity need to be solved or the potential for stalemate will remain as a legitimate concern.

Friends of democracy in Burma are apprehensive that the junta will enter into a deal with the ethnic nationalities and with the other components of the Convention that constitute the Burman majority. The National Convention, in mathematical terms, will be made of a majority who will support the junta and then legally draw the constitution and set up parliament. In this way, the SPDC will go through the National Convention and marginalize Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, finally bringing about her political end and the end of the NLD's political significance - the NLD being nothing without Daw Suu. This dire scenario will herald the victory of the junta's proposed 'disciplined democracy' at the expense of a parliamentary democracy as proposed by the NLD. A second possible outcome of the junta's roadmap is that the whole process will erode as eventually the ethnic nationalities leaders may become divided in the course of cooperating with the SPDC without the participation of Daw Suu. This scenario would spell the total collapse of the junta's roadmap. A third scenario will be that the SPDC will give part concessions to enable the NLD to participate. What these will be is unpredictable but it will keep the process going.

The first scenario is incompatible with the reality of Burma's politics. Even assuming that it becomes a reality the consequence will be opening the floodgates of democracy. The NLD can play a role of responsible opposition and in a short time change the balance of power. The second scenario, although a possibility, the SPDC will try its best to avoid.

The third scenario is a possibility. The main issue in this case would be whether the SPDC would give up its 104 principles and begin the National Convention on a clean slate. The second issue would be the composition of the National Convention. The elected members will of course form the majority and military personnel, about one third, may be accommodated if there is good will. Thirdly, the constitution making process must have transparency, accountability, inclusiveness and legitimacy. Unless the procedural rules of the convention are altered in consultation with the participants, the process will be like chasing a wild goose. The core of the matter as it stands today is that to convene all participants, the procedural rules must be based on freedom of _expression and rule of law.

The Junta's Panicky Warning of Delaying Democracy

Burma's Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, has warned that democracy would become a "distant reality" if the Burmese government met with interference along the roadmap toward a democratic state. This interference relates to two aspects: first, to internal non-cooperation and second, to international pressure.

According to him, the democracy movement must give the roadmap constructive support. They must either 'take it or leave it'. Any proposed differences made conditional by prospective participants for joining the Convention would amount to internal interference. The NLD's joining the National Convention first, without conditions, is a sine quo non for the junta. After having joined, they claim, differences could be aired inside the convention room and sorted out. The same applies to the new rules to be framed or old rules to be changed. The military, trained in discipline, will enforce the same discipline in the process of constitution making. At the international level, the international community must stop accusing the junta of violating human rights, employing forced labor and enlisting child soldiers in its armed forces. Western nations have to lay down their suspicion of the junta's sincerity to take the road to democratic rule.

General Khin Nyunt's warning is uncalled for. Both the leaders of the people in Burma and the international community have shown exemplary patience and the junta has to act, and act fast. The support of the international community is central to carrying out the junta's seven-step roadmap announced in August as the path towards democracy. The United Nations' 57th General Assembly, Third Committee 41st and 42nd meetings clearly outlined the basic prerequisites of a roadmap for political reform. To be successful, any credible political transition should be guided by human rights principles.

The international community has entrusted the Bangkok Process to be successful.

Therefore, all members of the process now have a holistic duty to ensure a change towards respect of human rights and rule of law are important components of the roadmap to democracy in Burma.