By Naw May Oo & Min Zaw Oo
Mizzima News (www.mizzima.com), January 28, 2004:

The Karen National Union (KNU) delegation left Rangoon on Thursday, 22 January 2004, without signing a formal agreement while military clashes and
human rights abuses are still occurring in Karen areas. Some observers speculate that the military is using a good-cop-bad-cop strategy to suppress the KNU under the guise of the ceasefire talk. Further speculation is that the KNU might have been politically ‘co-opted’ by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and that the talk is a political defeat for the Karen resistance movement.

Careful analysis based on the information from the sources close to the parties involved indicates that the SPDC’s leaders are likely to be divided on the ceasefire issue with the KNU. The peace initiative is indeed a set of two games played between both the opposition and the SPDC, and among the military’s factions.

Gen. Khin Nyunt, the Prime Minister, and his associates are the prime authors of the current ceasefire initiative, according to the sources close to the talks. Brig. Kyaw Thein, head of the Information and Intelligence Bureau under the Directorate of the Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), led the SPDC’s delegation. Thein Swe, Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, Brig. Than Tun, a member of the Domestic and International Information Department, Brig. Kyaw Han, head of the Counter Intelligence Department, were part of the SPDC’s delegation.

Gen. Khin Nyunt attended the meetings on the first and last day and communicated key concepts of the ceasefire to the KNU delegation. Gen. Kyaw Win, who is reportedly close to Sen. Gen. Than Shwe, also came only on the first and last days merely to greet the delegation. All attendees from the side of the SPDC were senior officials from the DDSI.

Although it is naturally necessary to have senior officials of field operations present to discuss the technical details of a ceasefire agreement, none of the senior officials from the War Office, the Burmese version of the Pentagon, was present at the talk. Four Bureaus of Special Operations are responsible for coordinating operations in various Regional Commands. Lt. Generals Ye Myint, Aung Htwe, Khin Maung Than and Maung Bo command four bureaus respectively, in coordination with regional and divisional commanders. None of them attended the meeting.

According to sources, a senior official from the SPDC delegation confessed that it was “extremely difficult” to implement the peace initiative with the KNU because some elements, especially field commanders, seem to believe that the Burmese Army is capable of wiping out the ethnic insurgency. The SPDC delegation had to report to the War Office with the notes from each day’s meeting for further discussions and approval.

The SPDC delegation, on many occasions, returned to the talks with sullen faces the next day just to scrap the preceding day’s agreements because the War Office struck them down. “We also have to do many things on our side [to accomplish the peace initiative],” said Gen. Khin Nyunt. DDSI’s Role in Ceasefire

Gen. Khin Nyunt’s role within the SPDC was revitalized through a promotion
to Prime Minister after the Depayin violence that killed scores of the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) supporters. The Depayin massacre consequently put intense international pressure on the SPDC, including new economic sanctions by the United States. Gen. Khin Nyunt apparently was allowed to gain new power in order to orchestrate political maneuvers amidst the crisis emerging out of the Depayin violence.

It is important to note that Gen. Khin Nyunt and the DDSI advocated for and initiated ceasefire arrangements even before the military takeover in 1988. The initial strategy of the ceasefire tactics was intended to strangle the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) by manipulating the ethnic sentiment among the rank and files of CPB’s military units.

The military intelligence has established a connection with Kokang leader, Phone Kyar Shin, since December 1987 when many ethnic-based units became disenchanted with the CPB’s Burman leadership. After the Kokang group (MNDA) broke away from the CPB in March 1989, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, personally met with Kokang leaders to implement a ceasefire agreement.

This ceasefire with the Kokang sparked a domino effect on other CPB-breakaway ethnic groups in the Shan State and one group after another has been enticed to sign agreements since 1989. Currently, fifteen armed groups have agreed officially to a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC while it unofficially has made deals with six splinter groups that are still armed.Not surprisingly, the ceasefire tactic has paid off for the intelligence faction, as it has been able to strengthen its power base inside the military leadership to compete with the field commanders. The intelligence faction in the military continues to utilize the ceasefires with the opposition groups to overcome the field-commander faction in the intra-military power struggle.

Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt and his associates have earned credit for the ceasefire agreements, which has granted them respect and also made them a powerful asset in the SPDC leadership. However, the intelligence group’s ceasefire arrangements seem to go beyond the intra-group power struggle.

It is apparent that the SPDC’s ceasefire agreements with the armed ethnic groups were not really necessitated by military stalemates or crises for the SPDC. Unlike the current Sri Lankan ceasefire that was largely made necessary by the military stalemate, the Burmese military did not encounter serious military pressure from the oppositions.

The military managed to repel the initial phase of the oppositions’ offensives right after the 1988 uprising. The Burma Army, after the 1988 uprising, had lost only one major tactical base, Mae Thawaw, which was later recaptured by the regime. The army, again, has stepped up its campaigns against the resistance movement since 1993 and currently occupies over 90 percent of the active rebel bases.

Within the SPDC’s current internal power struggle, some elements in the regime seem to view the civil war as unnecessary in order to control the ethnic rebellion. At the same time, the SPDC’s intent in pursuing further ceasefires is not solely to reunite with ethnic rebels as it continues to commit apparent human rights abuses. The SPDC is still constantly pressuring the existing non-ceasefire groups such as the Chin National Front (CNF), the Karenni Progressive Party (KNPP), and the KNU to enter ceasefire agreements. (The SPDC-KNPP ceasefire collapsed three months after signing.)

Nevertheless, some elements in the regime seem to rationalize the civil war as an undesired by-product of the development of the country. Some military leaders seem willing to de-escalate the violent conflict to a non-fighting stage if such de-escalation benefits the SPDC politically. The SPDC still refuses to address the political settlement of ethnic issues despite the existing ceasefire agreements.

Under the ceasefire agreements, the rebels are allowed to keep their army and limited territorial control in addition to the privileges of extracting natural resources and drug trafficking. The regime has made ceasefire agreements even with small groups, like Kayan National Guard that had only about 50 armed troops.

Peace Needs Both Levels

Even though some KNU senior officials are doubtful of the military’s intention for peace, the KNU leadership as a whole and the military commanders are willing to respect the ceasefire agreement if both sides ratify it. In contrast, SPDC’s commitment to the agreement seems unsettled among the leadership.

Field commanders of the SPDC are defiant of Gen. Khin Nyunt at the operational level. They perceive the intelligence officials as opportunists who receive privileges without sacrifice. When Gen. Khin Nyunt issued an order to stop using forced labor in 2001 because of the pressure from the International Labor Organization (ILO), the field commanders ignored it. Although the War Office issued operational expenses for ‘porters,’ the military units never utilized the money to hire people.

Past decisions allow field commanders to act autonomously today. In 1996, Gen. Maung Aye instructed military units to be prepared to be self-reliant without depending on the central command to support them logistically. The deteriorating economy and the sky-rocking price of basic goods do not have any effect on the military personnel.

Essentially, field commanders become small warlords in various regions. Many battalions depend on funds secured by each company. Battalions in the northern and eastern border regions reportedly have to send a certain amount of funds to divisional or regional command headquarters.

Gen. Khin Nyunt insisted that both sides be “serious” about the current peace initiative, sources close to the recent ceasefire talks said. While the KNU officials raised questions on the ongoing operations and human rights abuses in Karen areas, Gen. Khin Nyunt acknowledged that some elements, who do not agree on the peace initiative, were undermining the ceasefire. Although a ceasefire agreement was not officially signed, both delegations seem to be satisfied with the process. The KNU delegates received handsome treatment from the SPDC delegation.

Nevertheless, it will still be, undoubtedly, difficult to fully implement the ceasefire and peace deal between the KNU and the SPDC even if the truce is ratified. The hard-line faction and disgruntled field commanders are less likely to be duped by the truce.

At the moment, a formal agreement to a ceasefire between the KNU and the SPDC apparently demands much patience, sincerity, and political willingness.

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Naw May Oo is the Director of Communications and Min Zaw Oo is the Director of Outreach and Strategy at Washington-based Free Burma Coalition.
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