Can we fight
for freedom?
By Dr. Zarni, Mizzima
News (www.mizzima.com)
November 26,2003
Compiler's remark: This piece was written as a response to
the SPDC's latest spin that they are talking to Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi and that the contacts are regular and "positive."
My commentary does contains some lengthy sentences, but if
you could bear with them, I hope you will find this insider's
view of mine interesting. We need to keep things in larger
perspective, and not get stuck in our own little box - or
in whatever we are doing in our limited capacities to advance
the cause of Burma's freedom. One must not become orthodox,
rigid and fanatical.
Dear Compatriots and Friends of Burma's Democracy Movement:
None of us should be fooled by Deputy Foreign Minister Khin
Maung Win's spin that the government is in regular contact
with the NLD General Secretary and the leader of the democratic
movement in our country.
Col. or Brigadier General Than Htun has been SPDC's point
person handling Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for several years. Rumors
are that Than Htun may be stringing Daw Suu along, with the
argument that Daw Suu should cooperate with PM Khin Nyunt
and the supposed "moderates" within the SLORC/SPDC
inner circle or the "hard-liners" are going to have
an upper hand,which will be bad for the prospects for transition
in Burma.
We need a serious and critical look at the situation. Several
things to consider:
1). After the failed assassination attempt on her life on
May 30 which was designed to be made like a mob attack, without
a single assailant to be tried, SPDC realized its strategic
blunder. Were she killed, there would have been a major outrage
and outcry for a week or two by the West, but neither the
United Nations Security Council nor the unilateralist United
States would have moved swiftly to punish the perpetrators
of the defacto government in Burma with their 350,000 strong
army backed by China, India, ASEAN, and Russia, let alone
"why-can't-we-all-go-along" European Union.
SPDC TOOK CALCULATED RISKS and the PRICE IT PAID?
THE LOSS OF JAPAN AS ITS SUPPORTER.
But as we all know, the calculated risk taken by SPDC - or
a key part of that risk -- backfired and they lost Japan as
a quietly solid supporter and subsequently ASEAN was under
tremendous pressure to do or say something about the Depayin
incident. Hence all the flurry of talk within ASEAN about
the need to intervene, only if gently, in Rangoon's affairs.
THE EU DELAYED GOING TO BURMA WITH HUMAN/RELIEF ASSISTANCE
The EU was desperate to go in and deliver humanitarian aid
despite the political stalemate and worsening political situation
in Burma. However, they have been halted at Burma's doorsteps.
The EU continue to pursue their "civil society/middle-
class-first, democracy second" approach and try and test
their theory of "EVOLUTIONARY change toward democracy
in Burma," despite Daw Suu's repeated assertation that
Burma can not afford to wait a long period of time for transition.
The country needs change immediately as Burma has been spiraling
down at a fast rate.
CEMENTING THE US POSITION ON SANCTIONS
The May 30 massacres persuaded the US lawmakers to vote virtually
UNINAMOUSLY on the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003
and motivated President Bush and his team to come up with
additional punitive measures such as the Executive Order issued
immediately after he signed the Burma Freedom and Democracy
Act into law in July this year.
In short, the international position hardened and hope for
any type of
reconciliation and dialogue diminished.
SPDC's POST-MAY 30 STRATEGIES (FORTIFYING ITSELF WITH ASIAN
SUPPORT, PLAY ASIAN NEIGHBORS OFF AGAINST THE US, AND COMPLETE
THE SEDUCTION OF THE ANTI-SANCTIONS EU TO COME IN WITH THE
AID MONEY)
Khin Maung Win was sent to the ASEAN capitals and Tokyo to
explain SPDC's intention to reform Burma, tell the Asian leaders
that Daw Suu is under "protective custody" for her
own sake, and assure the latter that they - Than Shwe, Khin
Nyunt, Maung Aye, and Daw Suu -- would all get along if only
they are left to find their own solutions at their own pace,
showing old pictures of Daw Suu mingling with the Senior and
junior generals.
Foreign Minister Win Aung went to South Asia and did exactly
the same.
In the meantime, SPDC Ambassador Kyaw Win in London appeared
on talk shows and pissed the Europeans off by talking tough,
which in effect says "Go ahead and impose your sanctions
against our country by your God-given rights. We don't really
give a damn. We have China, India and other Asian neighbors
who we get along well with."
Also in the United States, the SPDC agents dropped their
charm offensive against some prominent dissidents. None of
the dissidents or prominent exiles took the bait including
Ko Moe Thee, Dr. Tun Kyaw Nyein, and myself. All except Daw
Aye Aye Thant, the daughter of the late U Thant, the Burmese
UN General Secretary whose death was seized on by the students
and people as the official pretext to challenge and revolt
against Ne Win's autocratic rule.
SLORC IS CAPABLE OF LYING WITH A STRAIGHT FACE
On the eve of and during the Bali Summit of the 2003 ASEAN
Ministerial
Conference and BKK APEC meeting, the two heavy-hitters of
SPDC attended and the SPDC Foreign Minister Win Aung told
the following lie with a straight face -
"DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI is recuperating in her own home
at 54 University Avenue and she is still strongly in the popular
and governmental consciousness. She is granted freedom of
movement."
Some say Daw Suu refuses to accept that limited freedom while
her colleagues who were arrested during or immediately after
May 30 attacks remain behind bars.
Whatever the case might be, SPDC is clearly keeping her from
communicating with the outside world - except for the two
UN special envoys - Razali and Pinhero - and her phone line
remains cut off.
SPDC RECOVERS FROM THE MAY 30 STRATEGIC BLUNDER
Six months after they committed this strategic blunder, SPDC
has regained its political balance for a number of factors:
a) The Opposition movement outside Burma has no clear or
able leadership that is pro-active and that is capable of
coming up with an effective multi- pronged strategy to take
advantage of the global sympathy for Burma among the general
population and within foreign governments. I will spare you,
my compatriots, the long list of our opposition's repeated
failures and why there is little or no hope or possibility
of the exile leadership at any level coming up with anything
that will match the SPDC's increasingly sophisticated, multi-pronger
strategy.
b) The ASEAN nations, China and India seem to have recognized
that THERE IS A problem in Burma - political deadlock -- and
that SPDC, left to its own vices, is unable to resolve or
address the situation in a manner and at a pace that would
benefit all parties. The most concerned appear to be the Thai
gang led by the ex-police man -Thaksin - that has numerous
political and economic reasons in needing to bail SPDC out.
So the Thais floated the idea of a "roadmap" without
giving away what the ingredients might be!
c) On August 30 this year, PM Khin Nyunt declared their 7-point
roadmap-smashing the
political volleyball that his counterpart Thaksin had tossed
up above the net. This is old wine in a new bottle, but couched
in the new US lingo.
d) For ASEAN as a whole, promoting "free trade"
that would largely benefit the richer, more influential members
such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indoenesia, Singapore and Brunei
is far more important than Burma's desperate need for political
reforms or that the Burmese people are going to damnation.
e) India has pretty much written off Burma's democracy movement
as a
political force that can eventually force the SPDC out of
power, and hence decided long ago to pursue a course of pragmatism.
Hence it didn't make much fuss about how SPDC is handling
its own business of crashing the opposition led by Daw Suu,
the winner of Nehru Award for Peace and follower of Gandhi-ji.
Instead, it has been signing memorandums of agreements left
and right and offering loans and other cooperation opportunities.
f) Having gained confidence as a regional and emerging world
power that has the potential to challange U.S. golobal hegemony,
Beijing's leadership is now looking to play a more sophisticated
game in the regional theatre. It is wooing ASEAN, Japan, India,
and Australia - dropping the more street-gang approach to
international diplomacy via military and political threats
and adopting TRADE and regional cooperation as its new ideologies
– now that it is a global economic power or fast becoming
one. This new development in Chinese strategic thinking, coupled
with the recognition that the little neighbor down South is
run by a group of generals who need a little help as the latter
remains third-rate and crude in their approach to crushing
internal dissent, compels the Chinese leadership to move out
of their original rationale - specifically that "Burma's
problems are internal problems and SPDC is capable of handling
them on their own." As a result, Burma's Pauk hpaws,
meaning the "born-togethers," are offering to assist
Thaksin and other Asian leaders who intend to intervene in
Burma's domestic problems on the side of the SPDC. And hence
the talk of Chinese participation in the December international
conference on Burma where the United States is certainly not
welcome and is not even going to be invited. Indeed, Asians
need or prefer an Asian solution - whatever that is.
g). For their part, the two official supporters of Burma
that matter in international politics - the United States
and the European Union – have their own preferences:
the EU doesn't have much interest in coming up with new sanctions
nor its leading political players believe, for a moment, in
the efficacy of sanctions.
The EU position goes something like this - prolonged sanctions
will only hurt the people, not the generals and their regime.
Some countries like the United Kingdom publicly say that they
believe in so-called SMART SANCTIONS targeting only the key
institutions in Burma. In the age of surgical air strikes
and laser guided smart bombs, WHY NOT!!!!? Prominent economists
like Jeff Sachs have put their names to articles that argue
for smart sanctions -- as opposed to all-embracing sanctions
against Rangoon -- and some Burmese policy advocates are parroting
the new lingo internationally.
As for the United States, it has, to the best of my knowledge,
absolutely no intention of doing the following:
a) Put Burma on the UN Security Council where it will have
to square off against or with China, Russia, and France, the
other 3 permanent members of that body;
b) Support any type of surgical military intervention in
Burma. Darryl Johnson, the American Ambassdor to Thailand,
has unequivocally and
categorically stated that the United States does not even
entertain the idea of intervening in Burma militarily (read
no military or material assistance to the armed resistance
inside Burma). The United States, as a matter of policy, doesn't
even wish to recognize or work on the need to do relief work
amongst hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced People
because doing so would require dealing with issues of providing
armed security for both aid delivery and for protecting these
human beings who are hunted down like animals by the SPDC
troops.
c) Appoint a Presidential Special Envoy to deal with Burma's
prolonged crisis led by the winner of the United States Presidental
Medal of Freedom.
The United States is unlikely to elevate the issue or problem
of Burma to the point where the United States President would
appoint a Presidential Special Envoy on Burma, authorized
to forcibly bargain with or talk to various players on President
George W. Bush's behalf. But it must be acknowledged that
President Bush has been supportive enough to allow his speech
writers to slip in Burma in some of his major speeches. The
seriousness of the US, despite several key pro-sanctions champions
among the US Law makers in Washington such as Senator Mitch
McConnell, is fairly low. This actual weight or value of US
support for Burma has correctly been assessed by the smart
international journalists who chose not to bother to raise
Burma questions even when Mr. Bush made a brief mention of
Burma on several major occassions including at the press conference
in Bangkok, his major speech at the National Endowment for
Democracy, and in London. Indeed the press knows President
Bush has more important thing so sorry about, such as the
quagmire in Iraq, the escalating attacks by Islamic groups,
2004 elections, the economy at home or the growing challenge
posed y China in Asian Pacific region. etc.
SPDC's CURRENT MOVES. (Thanks to strategic advise from Thaksin)
SPDC and its Asian neighbors have taken a highly pro-active
and collective approach to addressing the problem in Burma
via the roadmap.
A few notables here:
a) Everyone knows that PM Khin Nyunt, the supposedly most
sophisticated military man, is a fall guy who has been given
a new lease. (This politician n military garb was groomed
by the late Ne Win post-sacking of MI Chief ino by the now
deceased dictator.) ASEAN and China know about this and they
see him - not Daw Aung San Suu Kyi – as the key to getting
limited changes/"reforms" - off the ground in Burma.
For ASEAN, it needs at least a quasi-civilianized government
in Rangoon by 2006 when Myanmar takes the chairmanship of
the ASEAN.
For China, it begins to care about its image internationally
as it is in the early phase of accumulating its soft-power
(at a time when the United States has squandered its soft-power
and have resorted to brute force to enforce its will) as well
as boost its economic and political and geo-strategic interests
around the globe. The only opposition at the ASEAN meeting
came from the Philippine's Foreign Minister, who was a bit
out of line with the official ASEAN stand on Burma, and the
retiring Dr. Mahathir who felt slighted by SPDC's moves which
diminished the importance of the mission of his special envoy
Razali and therefore talked about "expelling" Burma
from the ASEAN.
There is a theory in the intelligence community in South
East Asia that PM Khin Nyunt and his more sophistciated colleagues
and subordinates are going to assert their power and influence
over the ways things are resolved or addressed in Burma vis-a-vis
their more crude and crass colleagues in the so-called "hard-line"
camp within the military's inner circle.
The ASEAN nations, China and India appear to be on the same
page as they are fully behind PM Khin Nyunt and his strategic
maneuverings the latest being "the call for National
Convention" as step one along the roadmap (toward lesser
hell in Burma - not a bad thing in and of itself if you actually
live there).
It appears that the Burma problem is being taken out of the
United States' hand which had, since 1990 elections, put all
the Asian nations on defensive and being firmly in the hands
of China, India and ASEAN. Australia has been quiet as it
seems to be in agreement with the Asian-Pacific solution proactively
pursued by the two Asian giants and ASEAN in Burma. Also it
has already staked out the evolutionary position on Burma
long before the EU came around to it.
THE LATEST MOVES BY THE SPDCies
SPDC has thrown yet another problem at the democratic opposition.
Reminiscient of the 20's and 30's when the British colonial
strategists came up with various strategic responses to the
native demands which destroyed the natives' fragile cooperation
and solid alliances, SPDC is now using the National Convention
as a way to drive wedge between inner circles of different
groups, tailoring their seduction, cooptation and argument
to suit the needs of a given group.
a) Re: the United States, SPDC is intending to lobby for
"assurances
for their economic holdings, amnesty, the future role of the
top brass
and the army as an institution, a transition and post-transition
and a certain percentage of seats in the parliament for the
army".
b) As with their offer to the KNU, Col. San Pwint and co.
were "persuading" the KNU leadership at Mae Sot,
Thailand, to return to the legal fold – SPDC's lingo
for surrender.
c) As with Thailand, SPDC has successfully persuaded the
willing partner in BKK to pressure the KNU to withdraw from
the Mae Tha Raw Hta Agreement signed in Jan. 1997, in which
non-Burma, non-cease fire groups pledged support for Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and the NLD.
d) As for Daw Suu Kyi, well, they don't really seem to expect
her to join the National Convention and they intend to leave
her in the political ditch. Except for the United States,
no one appears prepared to even scream at the foul play in
Burma. Kofi Annan came out and criticized the roadmap- but
again who takes him seriously??
e) UNLD and UNLA may be under serious pressure and seduction
now that SPDC may be unofficially telling the leaders that
the Armed Forces and the generals are prepared to accept some
kind of "federalism" – perhaps not the exact
word that may be used - but the generals also know how to
play soft- ball when they need to. Hence they have guys like
Khin Nyunt running the damage-control-cum-pro-active-offense
show.
f) SPDC is hoping - and ready - to take what it can from
this National Convention game plan. They don't appear to be
viewing this as an all-or- nothing game, a clear sign of SPDC
politically coming of age in the Burmese political cultural
context where everything has to be black or white.
So the opposition which is still stuck in that ancient political
mode has so much too lose - as do the leaders at the top.
The movement's rank and file are going to begin bickering
among themselves about what is best for their communities
and organziations as strategic options. If a few opt out to
take the SPDC's bait, then SPDC wins round 1 in the roadmap
and the opposition will spiral down one more notch. Regardless,
the hard-to-please exiles are going to scream on the Internet,
regardless of which choices the leaders make who really don't
have many choices to start with.
OPTIONS FOR THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION: MORE SPECIFICALLY,
THE EXILE GROUPS
Forget what we will tell Daw Suu and NLD, they will do what
they think
is best. If they make mistakes, they make mistakes. Frankly,
no one, or no Burmese exiles, from outside seems to be listened
to any strategic advice. Correct me if I am wrong here.
So brace ourselves for potential consequences for the decisions
the leaders in Rangoon made - both democrats and military.
AS A MOVEMENT, OUR SITUATION IS NO DIFFERENT THAN THE ONE
FACED BY THE KAREN NATIONAL UNION'S - WE ARE BETWEEN A ROCK
AND A HARD PLACE.
Despite sanctions and subsequent punishment of the two banks
in Burma for money laundering, we must not get our hopes high.
To the best of my knowledge, the United States isn't prepared
to use its political, diplomatic or financial capital to really
help this democracy movement win eventual victory in Burma.
Granted it is not about winning or defeating SPDC as our goal
really is to set the democratic transition in motion in Burma.
Pursuit of political transition is not cheap; Iraq and Afghanistan
are two present day examples of how expensive the business
of ending dictatorships and restoring demcoracy is.
The ANC in South Africa had Scandinavia and the rest of Europe
who backed them up financially and politically and without
requiring expense receipts from the ANC internal resistance.
Pope John Paul II knows a thing or two about funding democracy
movements as his Vatican was pouring millions of dollars into
the Poland's Solidary. (Don't buy into guys like Vaclav Havel
when he claims wildly citizens' collective power - or "the
power of the powerless"- and the power of writings could
force totalitarian regime out - the CIA was pouring billions
of dollars into initiatives to destroy "the evil empire"
or the USSR over at least 40 years' period. Velvet or Rose
Revolutions in Burma would surely be met with bullets from
the newly made M1 9 German-patented automatic machine guns
and Chinese-made tanks.)
But even the goal of trying to set the process of getting
the genuinely democratic National Convention in motion would
require a serious infusion of help - money, technology and
so on - to the democratic leadership, as well as a serious
push politically and diplomatically.
There are no signs that anything of substance is coming in
for our movement from any quarter - not from the United States
nor from Canada nor Scandianavia nor the European Union as
a bloc.
Sanctions are cheap - actually supporting the movement in
a manner that will make a difference is indeed expensive and
can be messy.
In our fight for freedom in Burma, the Burmese have for too
long been ready - ready to make necessary sacrifices, as it
were - but it is the democratic world that is not ready to
support us beyond words.
OUR MOVEMENT HAS COME FULL CIRLCE -
There have been dissidents from among ourselves - prominent
as well as little known ones - that make both official public
and gossipy statements.
HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO PROSPECTS FOR PEOPLE POWER UPRISINGS
OR A VIABLE INTERNAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT INSIDE BURMA.
The only way the Burma problem may be solved is through the
UN Security Council, US intervention or diplomatic wrangling.
But are we totally obvious to the harsh reality. That our
movement does NOT enjoy solid and unwavering support from
the democratic world. That has been is the reputation we,
unfortunately, have had over these years. That is the basis
of hope, rumor, speculation among the nonviolent Burmese resistance
inside Burma led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
It appears to me that Daw Suu and her top leadership has
long been awake to this reality judging from their actions.
Daw Suu stays on inside Burma because she knows that's where
the real power struggle is, that's where the real power play
is, that's where things that matter take place. For the struggle
for people's freedom must be where the people are.
Now on our part as rank and file members of the exile movement
in particular and the movement at large, we have naively or
delusionally refused to wake up to this rude cold, harsh reality
until the 11th hour.
I don't know what that involves nor do I, frankly speaking,
have any clue as to where to begin beyond the recognition
that we exiles have failed, once again, to provide what our
fellow dissidents inside Burma need from us - all kinds of
support - as they struggle on under extremely trying circumstances.
But until and unless we come to terms with this reality that
without the people's participation inside Burma and without
the strategies that focus on building the momentum of people's
activities inside Burma and go beyond crying for more sanctions
and more pressure, I think we are like a group of drunken
men who kept on rowing their boat all night long only to discover
in the morning that the boat is stilled tied to the river
bank.
For only fools and cowards look to the world as the primary
venue of liberation for our people, our country and our minds.
As Frederick Doudlas, the run-away enslaved African man once
said: 'Power never concedes without a fight. It never does
and it never will."
The crucial question that lies before us is the following:
Do we as exiles, who want the power to change the course
of our motherland, have the courage, vision, resourcefulness,
and determination to fight for our country's freedom?
( Dr. Zarni is the founder and director of the US-based Free
Burma Coaliation )
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