By Aung Naing Oo, Mizzima News (www.mizzima.com )

October 30, 2003:

Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has had its hands
full since the announcement of its roadmap to democracy on August 30. Given
the earnest preparations regarding the reconvening of the long suspended
National Convention (NC) and the finishing of the proposed constitution, the
junta’s tenacity is apparent. The NC, however, could become a negotiating
forum if the current opposition to the convention and the proposed charter
continues.

Within two months of its roadmap policy declaration, the SPDC appointed and
reappointed high-ranking military officers and top civil employees as key members of the National Convention Convening Commission. Rangoon has also
selected a number of other senior government officials for various Convention Working Committees. Its political wing, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), has been busy organizing rallies across the country. These rallies are specially designed to solicit support for the junta's NC and the proposed roadmap.

Encouraged by their first diplomatic victory, secured at the recent Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) Summit in Bali, Indonesia, the Burmese junta has continued to promote and defend its roadmap for democracy. In a statement issued on October 16th, the SPDC urged critics to join hands with it on the road to democracy and reminded them that it is a “complex and difficult endeavor, particularly in a country like Myanmar.”

Recently, the SPDC’s Labor Minister, Win Tin, defended his government’s inability to spell out any details of the NC. He even blamed the National League for Democracy (NLD) for the original NC’s failure, citing their boycott in 1995, and noting that the party left the convention voluntarily. Likewise, the Rangoon junta lashed out at US President George Bush for his disparaging remarks towards the junta’s roadmap during the recent Apec meeting in Thailand.

Undoubtedly, the SPDC will continue to work to garner support on both domestic and international fronts. The Burmese generals know that while internal support for its roadmap is crucial, external - more precisely regional - backing will ultimately determine the success of their blueprint for democracy.

Unfortunately for the junta, however, no major political or ethnic groups have expressed total support for the roadmap. Although no one rejects the concept of holding a national convention to resolve the country’s long-standing problems, all key political and ethnic entities have questioned the NC process and the contents of the proposed constitution.

Khun Htun Oo, leader of the Shan National League for Democracy, which won
the second largest number of parliamentary seats in the 1990 elections, told
the Democratic Voice of Burma on September 6th that he and his group did not
want to become culprits by joining the NC in its present setup. The Shan
leader called for appropriate changes to be made to the NC. According to the
Irrawaddy magazine, even the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Rangoon’s closest truce partner, confirmed that it would attend the NC only if certain
conditions were met. In a statement jointly signed by two other ceasefire groups, the UWSA demanded “free choice of delegates, free discussions and
freedom of meeting among ethnic leaders” as pre-conditions for their participation in the NC. It is highly unlikely that the SPDC will grant these conditions.

Other key political ethnic organizations that have articulated their positions on NC and the constitution include the Kachin Independent Organization, the New Mon State Party, and the Committee Representing Peoples’ Parliament. The Karen National Union, one of the few remaining armed ethnic groups that haven't signed a truce with Rangoon, called the roadmap “the lost road to nowhere,” in a statement issued last month. Major ethnic alliances, including the United Nationalities League for Democracy and the United Nationalities Alliance, have also made their opposition to the NC known.

Given the nature of Burmese politics and the strong-armed tactics of the Burmese junta, these organizations are subject to harassment, coercion and
other forms of unjust pressure from the SPDC for rejection of the NC. Yet,
it is likely that they will continue to insist that appropriate changes be introduced before the NC can reconvene with their support. As all of these
organizations have seen or experienced a series of broken promises from the
Burmese generals, they have little reason to trust the junta.

Furthermore, the Burmese regime has had more than a decade to work towards
democracy and reconciliation. So far nothing has been achieved, nor has any
progress has been made. Undeniably, suspicion and distrust of regime leaders
has also grown proportionately following the Depayin ambush on the NLD and
its supporters. Despite obvious threats, the people, particularly political and ethnic entities, are unlikely to provide support or legitimacy to the regime’s roadmap and its pursuit of a perpetual hold on power.

Elsewhere, according to the exiled National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, the Australian Federal Parliament Joint Standing Committee and the Governing Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva contend that the NC is “designed to prolong and legitimize military rule against the will of the people.” Likewise, the US and EU object to the restrictiveness of the NC process, as well as the exclusion of Aung San Suu Kyi and other key leaders.

Asean will continue to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Eventually, it is likely – despite its initial support for the roadmap - that Asean will also ask the SPDC to liberalize the NC process and give up some of its unrealistic demands. This may happen when the regional grouping realizes the extent of internal opposition to both the NC and the proposed constitution.

Without domestic support and from within the region, it will be extremely difficult for the SPDC to achieve its goals. Under these circumstances, the regime will be faced with two choices. The first is to continue to ignore calls for NC reforms – in which case the entrenchment will continue and the conflict in the country will persist. If the regime opts for this choice, it is likely that the SPDC will lose what little credibility it has with regional allies. The second is to give up some of its own demands in the proposed charter and implement greater inclusiveness in the NC process - in which case the NC could become a negotiating table.

So far nothing concrete is known as to how the drama will unfold; the regime
has not committed to any specifics regarding the NC. The SPDC leaders may
still have a few tricks up their sleeves. But they appear to be aware of the
potential roadblocks in their roadmap. There is no way back now, as the junta has assured its commitment to a roadmap toward democracy. Whether the
SPDC leaders choose the road of least resistance depends on their wisdom and
farsightedness.

Aung Naing Oo is a research associate with Washington-based the Burma Fund.