By Aung Naing Oo
Mizzima News (www.mizzima.com) October 20, 2003:

“It was like hell boiling over.” This was the portrayal of the Depayin ambush given by U Khin Zaw. As a prime witness of the assault on May 30, he said he saw “the wounded, dying victims moaning and wailing in pain, shrieking in agony, and crying for help.” His testimony was made at Thailand’s Senate Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs recently. Indeed, the ambush must have been ruthless mayhem.

U Khin Zaw’s eyewitness account came a month after the ambush, when he had
fled Burma and reached the safety of Thailand. He was very lucky to have escaped from the carnage unhurt. Several of his colleagues from the National League for Democracy (NLD), whom he knew personally, were not so lucky. They have paid with their lives for freedom that is yet to be won.

The ambush took place on May 30. Burma's democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi
had wrapped up her Upper Burma visit. She was on her way home. Her entourage was driving past a village called “Kyi” near Depayin town that evening. Little did they know that hired thugs from the Burmese junta’s political
wing, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), were laying
in wait for them. Taking advantage of the dusk, the pro-government goons
attacked the unarmed political activists. They used pointed bamboos, iron bars and swords, shouting derogatory abuses against Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD.

Luckily, Aung San Suu Kyi escaped with minor injury. But scores were killed
and unknown numbers of political activists were wounded in the melee. Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) detained more than 140 NLD members following the attack. The Assistance Association to Political Prisoners, which tracks all political prisoners inside Burma, has listed another 120 people as missing. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and all of the other top NLD leaders were also taken into custody.

And the Burmese regime asserted that it was the scuffle between the supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi and those who opposed her and her activities.

At a deep level, the Dapayin ambush has decidedly changed Burma’s political
landscape. It has effectively terminated Burma’s fragile path to reconciliation between SPDC leaders and the NLD. Even the UN Human Rights investigator, Mr. Pinheiro, reported that the ambush “killed all hopes for political reconciliation.” It is difficult to imagine how Burma will get back on her feet without these reconciliation efforts.

For now, it is clear that the SPDC orchestrated the assault on Aung San Suu
Kyi and her entourage. This was a strategic mistake. When the junta went on
to detain Aung San Suu Kyi and her lieutenants, the ambush, now known as “the Depayin Massacre” or “the Black Friday” as it happened on Friday the
May 30, became a double blunder. Worse still, Rangoon has continued to lie
about the incident.

But the evidence has eventually surfaced. Diplomats and journalists who visited the area following the ambush concurred that it indeed was one-sided battle in which the only weapon the NLD supporters had was non-violence. Their interviews with villagers also revealed that the military personnel were behind the planning of the attack, including the recruiting, training and providing logistics and direction to the attackers. Likewise, a number of NLD officials who escaped from the bloodbath have been able to speak to various journals and radio broadcasts. Those who made it to Thailand and beyond also provided testimonies to foreign legislators, such as the US Congress and the Senate of Thailand.

Nearly five months on, however, the Burmese regime has done nothing to shed
light on the incident. As the SPDC refuses to confront any independent inquiry, repeated calls for an investigation into the ambush have been ignored. A number of activists have even been incarcerated for alleged dissemination of information about the Depayin massacre. Apparently Rangoon will continue to bury the incident as deeply as possible - but political organizations and relatives of the ambush victims will continue to demand justice.

To add fuel to the frustration of the Burmese people, army generals widely
believed to be hardliners – with at least one of them reportedly being directly responsible for the ambush - have been promoted to important positions in the military hierarchy. It is an indication that the SPDC has hardened its stance towards opposition groups. This certainly does not help. Neither did help the possible implementation of the so-called roadmap for democratization in Burma because the roadmap is not designed to address the ambush and various other human rights abuses. And given the current activities and policies of the junta, it is clear that for the time being the SPDC will be able to put a lid on anything related to the May attack.

The ambush, however, will remain a stumbling block in the future. If the negotiations were to take place in the future, the Depayin ambush is likely to be a new agenda. Thus, it stands in the way of reconciliation. The window of opportunity for reconciliation has yet to reappear, and will only do so if the Burmese junta fails in its current efforts to award itself a prominent role in leading the country in the future.

But the incident has not, and will not be forgotten. A group of exiled lawyers and opposition politicians have formed a committee to gather more evidence on the ambush. They want to see justice done and will continue to highlight the incident at home and abroad.

News has emerged that Aung San Suu Kyi would like to see a truthful inquiry
into the ambush. The UN Special Envoy, Mr. Razali Ismail, disclosed this upon returning from Rangoon earlier this month.

Beyond Burma’s political elite, the ambush has had wide-ranging effects on
Burmese society. “It dramatically increased the fear of the Burmese people,”
said Aung Htoo, an exile lawyer with the Depayin Massacre investigation committee. The lawyer lamented, “They are like robots on TV,” referring to the way people act in junta-organized rallies following the massacre in order to garner support for its roadmap.

What is even more critical is the disappearance of what little trust the people might have had in the SPDC leaders in the wake of the ambush. “Without trust, reconciliation is not possible,” said Aung Myo Min who runs the Human Rights Education Institute of Burma located in neighboring Thailand. “And trust can only be induced when there is a truth about the ‘May Massacre’.”

Further, concealing the truth not only means that reconciliation is impossible at this time but also that the state-sponsored culture of violence will continue unabated. What will the family members of the victims say if nothing is known about the fate of their beloved ones, some of whom have died and others of which are still missing? Without a doubt, the memory of the ambush will remain ingrained in the minds of Burmese people, even if the SPDC succeeds in realizing its goals for "roadmap".

Reconciliation goes both ways. The Burmese junta is ultimately responsible
for revealing the truth about the May ambush. Likewise, the victims must
also be able to “break out of a situation of silence, isolation, fear and falsehood to know the truth,” wrote Kanbawza Win in his working paper published by the Burma Fund in 2002 entitled: “Impunity Inconceivable.”

Aung Myo Min agreed, but points out that Burma’s current legal and political
system does not favor such a situation.

Undoubtedly, the Depayin ambush was clearly an attempt by the SPDC to put an
end to internal political movement. While it has been critically wounded, it remains alive and kicking. But violence in Burma is unlikely to end here. As
in some transitions, violence during the political negotiations or regime change may be unavoidable. It will surely surge again in Burma. And no one can guarantee the safety of Aung San Suu Kyi in a conflict like the one Burma faces today. Even if current political paradigm shifts, it is likely that the losers in the military will use violence to get their demands met.

In 1993, an assassin with links to a right wing party gunned down Chris Hani, charismatic General Secretary of South African Communist Party. It happened a month after negotiations between the Apartheid Government and other stakeholders resumed. Hani was regarded as a hero among black communities and his death brought some violence from angry South Africans. But his death strengthened rather than weakened the negotiation process.

The most difficult part of the reconciliation process is tackling the ruthless killings. Will the USDA be ultimately held responsible? Will the Burmese generals learn from their past mistakes? Can the Burmese political elite from both sides of the aisle overcome these obstacles to reconciliation? It is too early to say, but if the Burmese regime recognizes the need for uncovering the truth about the ambush, one may be able to say that reconciliation is at least possible. Even then it will be only the start of a long and difficult journey.

Aung Naing Oo is a research associate with Washington-based The Burma
Fund.