| Debate on Burma’s
Road Map
REPLY TO KANBAWZA WIN’S CONTAGIOUS DISEASE OF ROAD
MAP
Ever since the ENSCC Road Map for democratic transition in
Burma was released, a number of reactions from both friends
and foes alike are received, some are very positive but some
are quite critical. Both are welcomed. Since the ENSCC has
taken a big step for a big mission, it was realized from the
very beginning that not every one would agree or understand
the idea behind the proposal, which suggests a peaceful democratic
transition in Burma.
We all love our country and our people, and we believe that
Burma deserves peace and democracy, freedom and prosperity,
justice and equality for her people. We want to end the oppressive
regime, we want to end five decades long of civil war, we
want to end human rights abuses, and we want to end any kind
of injustice in Burma.
We want to see all of our beloved friends who are held unjustly
in prisons become free, we want to see all refugees return
home safely, we want to see all who are in exile reunite with
their loved ones and we want to see our country becomes free.
We want to see our country no longer as a big prison but
as a free and open society where various ethnic nationalities
can live peacefully together.
We want to solve our country’s problem but we don’t
believe in violent means. Violence only begets violence, and
there is no solution after fifty years of violent conflicts
in Burma. If violent means were a solution, the military regime
would have been a solution already for they are opting for
such a solution ever since they first came to power in 1962.
We don’t believe in a zero-sum game, which will lead
our country into a lose-lose situation.
In a nutshell, we want to solve our crisis through a peaceful
means where the biggest winner will be the people, the ordinary
folks. We believe that we follow Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
method of non-violent strategy, for she herself is opting
to solve our country’s problem through dialogue. And
we obey the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution,
which calls for a “tripartite dialogue.”
Critics like Kanbawza Win who claims that the ENSCC Road
Map “does not call for immediate release of all political
prisoners, gloss over the crimes against humanity such as
the 1988 massacre and the latest butchering at Depayin.”
He made his point quite clearly but he failed to see the very
nature of ENSCC Road Map. Theories say that there are at least
three different kinds of political transition road map; 1)
Demanding Road Map, 2) Process Inviting Road Map, and 3) A
Comprehensive Transition Plan. Ours is not a “demanding
road map” nor a “comprehensive transition plan”
but “process inviting road map” through which
we invite our conflict partners (whom we want to turn into
our peace partners) to join hands. We are not going to shy
away from the method that we have chosen, because we dare
to make peace with our enemy. After all, peace is made with
enemy not with friend.
Secondly, Kanbawza Win failed to differentiate “road
map” from “blue print”. Any kind of political
transition “road map”, even “a comprehensive
transition plan”, is not a “blue print”.
“Blue print” is not easily changeable but “road
map” is. In normal situation, “road map”
should be produced after discussion with opposite party or
parties. That’s why pre-negotiation talks are needed
in transition to democracy, as we have seen in South Africa
and elsewhere. Unfortunately, we are not in normal situation;
our opposition does not believe in peaceful means of conflict
resolution but violent oppression.
However, we should carefully avoid playing the games our
enemy wants us to play, that is---any kind of violent confrontations.
They know that they are going to win if we engage in the games
they set, because they are masters in dealing with violence.
Violent confrontation is the name of their game, which we
should avoid. On the other end, they refuse to engage dialogue
because they know and think that they are going to lose if
they enter into a dialogue table. So, we should know what
are our strong points and our weak points, and turn our weak
points into strong points. This simple method will be helpful,
if we apply properly. We believe in “tripartite dialogue”;
not only because it is called for by the UN, but it also reflects
the very nature of political situation in Burma. The essence
of “tripartite dialogue” is “inclusiveness”
and “recognition”, which includes all major conflicting
parties in Burma and at the same time recognizes the 1990
election result, recognizes the SPDC as de facto government
in Burma (not as de jure government, Kanbawza Win is just
twisting the word in order to blame), and recognizes ethnic
nationalities as the founding members of the Union, and thereby
one of the major political actors in Burma.
This is unfortunate that although the UN and international
community recognize ethnic nationalities---through UNGA resolution---as
major political actors in Burma, Kanbawza Win plays down the
role of ethnic nationalities merely as “pressure groups”
or “activist groups”, by comparing with Burmese
in Diaspora and international NGOs. And he wants us to follow
the “Lion” like “hyenas”. It reminds
me of Ne Win’s exhortation of “nout-like kaung
hmah khong-soung-kong peta-de”, literally, “You
must be a good follower in order to become a good leader”.
The simple reason for creating such a saying is that they
want us to “keep silent, follow the leader, and obey
the order”, as successive military regimes since Ne
Win’s want us to do. And they are always the “Lion”
and we are merely “hyenas”.
Let me be very frank: without ethnic nationalities participation
in this transition process, you might be able to change the
government in Rangoon but you will never be able to solve
the political crisis in Burma. I am sure Kanbawza Win can
see the difference between changing the government in Rangoon
and solving political crisis in Burma. Let me put in different
way: political crisis in Burma today is not merely ideological
confrontation between democracy and dictatorship which can
be solved through changing the government in Rangoon, but
this also is constitutional problem rooted in the question
of the rights of self-determination for ethnic nationalities
who joined the Union of Burma as equal partners and co-founders
in 1947. So, if you do not recognize ethnic nationalities
as one of the main actors and equal partners in Burma politics,
there is no way to end 50 years of civil war in Burma. I sincerely
think that we should learn lessons from fifty years of civil
war in which we have lost too many lives already. If we try
to learn this lesson, Kanbawza Win should appreciate, instead
of blaming, the ethnic nationalities initiative.
Finally, I would like to clarify that in any political road
map or transition plan, there are always two components: the
“process” and the “substance”. The
“substance” is a matter of what we want to achieve.
What kind of outcome we want to see through this road map?
What sort of political structure will be the component of
the solution over which we are going to negotiate during the
“process”? In short, this is the substance of
the solution itself, and the goal of our struggle. “Process”,
on the other hand, is a business of negotiation and dialogue,
which focus on the elements of the solution but not the solution
itself, that is, how to get to a solution? As such, one can
clearly see that the ENSCC Road Map is for “process
initiative” not a comprehensive transition plan with
detail of account of the “substance”. We only
produce a road map for “process initiative”, or
“process inviting”; because we think that it is
unwise to put everything on the table at once.
Sincerely,
Lian H. Sakhong
2003-09-09
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