by Saw Kapi

Speculation abounds within Burma's democratic forces and the international
community, as the State Peace and Development Council, one of the longest
running military regimes in the world, makes a fresh move. The SPDC has offered its seven-step road map that calls for the resumption of National Convention as its first step. As recently as last week, the junta quietly sent its representative, Col. San Bwint, to the Thai-Burmese border in order to persuade the Karens to come back to the "legal fold" and take part in the proposed process. Along with Col. San Bwint came U Khun Mya, a well-known Kachin ceasefire broker, and Rev. Saw Margay Gyi, General Secretary of the Bible Society - Burma, who has been known to have a cordial relationship with Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. Meanwhile, some Karen academics and businessmen in Rangoon are eager to persuade the KNU to give serious consideration to PM Khin Nyunt's "road map" and seize what opportunities the offer may obtain. Although it is not entirely clear what messages the SPDC wants to convey to the KNU, it is obvious to the opposition forces that PM Khin Nyunt, surrounded by support from China and neighboring countries such as Thailand, is pushing ahead with his seven-step initiative, strategically approaching both cease-fire and non-cease-fire armed resistance groups and, in particular, the Karen National Union (KNU). In response to this political move, the KNU leadership needs to adopt a multi-prong approach that goes beyond usual closed-circle meetings among themselves. The rank and file of Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of KNU and other key democratic allies need to be informed strategically on time on the development of the situation. Keeping the international community and media organizations in the loop and seeking assistance from the Karen Diaspora in particular could be considered as part of a broader strategy.

In striving to find an enduring solution to Burma's political problems, the KNU generally has not focused on the Karen exclusively but rather on the entire nation, by working in alliance with other nationalities including the Burmese pro-emocracy opposition groups. This time, the KNU is seemingly going one step further and probing into the PM Khin Nyunt's seven-step political roadmap. A team ofdelegates including Maj. Ner Dah Mya, commander of KNLA's Battalion 201 and son of KNU Vice Chairman Gen. Saw Bo Mya, and Lt. Col. Paw Doh of KNLA's Special Battalion 101, reportedly met with Col. San Bwint, the SPDC point man for dealing with the
KNU, was flown into Yangon on December 3. The five-member team apparently does not include Maj. Ner Dah Mya. The delegation is meeting with high-ranking SPDC officials including PM Khin Nyunt in Yangon. Sources from the KNU caution, however, that the team has not been given any authority by the KNU Central Committee to negotiate any deal but has been only asked to look into the possibility of solving Burma's political problem by political means. The fact that Gen. Bo Mya has been deliberately behind this move makes it more noteworthy. Conversely, the KNU team, which consists mainly of junior KNLA commanders, raises some questions about the leverage the group has in this process. Regardless, the move indicates an unusual approach from the part of the KNU. Because the KNU's official position has always been that it is open to discuss political issues with SPDC without any precondition, this type of engagement cannot be considered a policy shift. Whether the KNU will be invited to attend the National Convention is not known. However, if an invitation is offered, the KNU may well consider accepting, although it will surely weigh its decision in
consideration of the official position of the National League for Democracy.

The junta's strategy, obviously, is to bring the ethnic nationalities forces, ceasefire as well as non-ceasefire groups, to play its game and garner as much legitimacy as it possibly can, while leaving the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the most credible threat to the regime's power, out in the cold. Once it can mute ethnic resistance forces, the junta believes that it will be able to directly challenge the NLD on a much stronger political ground. In the meantime, reports coming out of inside sources indicate that Col. Than Tun has been meeting on and off with Aung San Suu Kyi lately; the nature of the talks between the two is not yet known.
The NLD is yet to declare its official position on the proposed roadmap.

In light of recent increased involvement of the Thai government, in particular of its Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, Burma's political problems offer opportunities to neighboring governments in their struggle for regional power. Some senior Thai officials are reportedly talking to the KNU in an attempt to help persuade the Karens into a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC. Just recently, the Bangkok Post reports that Thailand will host a ten-nation meeting to discuss Burma's proposed "road map" toward democratic
transition. According to the report, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra confirmed Bangkok is expecting representatives from up to ten countries to attend the forum which is due to be held on December 15. Since Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew has effectively retired from politics and Prime Minister Mahathia Mohammad of Malaysia is soon to leave his office, it seems Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is keen to assert Thai political influence over regional matters. In an attempt to become a player in global politics, Thailand's leaders see Burma's politics as a good entry point. Both Shinawatra and Sathirathai identify the need to tame the rogue Burmese regime and understand that solving the Burma problem or managing it
will score points politically and be economically rewarding to their country. After all, foreign policies are a byproduct of both national interests and personal ambitions.

On the one hand, the KNU must strategically consider its political options to get out of the current political deadlock and find the best possible solution for the Karen people and Burma. But it would be foolhardy to deal with the SPDC as if it was a completely unified entity with good intentions for the country. Although ostensibly unpopular among the democratic opposition, the practical view may be if the pro-democracy opposition groups, including the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, choose to fully reject PM Khin Nyunt's seven-step road map, it will strengthen
the position of hardliners within the SPDC and weaken that of the moderates. For the ethnic nationalities armed resistance groups, choices are limited and fifty plus years of experience has made it evident, especially for the Karens, that it is politically unrealistic to base their political destiny solely on the sincerity of the military junta. For a regime that has been bent on the policy of oppression and military suppression for decades, sincerity has not been a significant concern
and, presumably, is not of high importance. The KNU and other democratic forces
have to confront the realities, and continue to struggle with the understanding that politics by nature is dynamic and fluid, and it at times requires our ability to know when and how to (or not to) strike a strategic deal with our opponents.

Edward W. Said, the late world-renowned Palestinian intellectual who passed
away recently in exile in New York, once observed, "Look at a situation as
contingent, not as inevitable, look at them as the result of a series of historical choices made by men and women, as facts of society made by human beings, and not as natural or god-given, therefore unchangeable, permanent, irreversible." It is only imperative that the KNU leadership makes the right historical choices as it finds itself at the crossroads of its resistance history, for the choices made today will have long-term ramifications for both the Karens as a people and Burma as a nation state.

Saw Kapi, Burma Strategy Group
December 6, 2003
San Francisco, California