This is the excerpt from Alternative Asean publication November 2003 Special Report. Prepared by Anil Verma BURMA-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Few governments have formed cohesive, comprehensive policies on their approach to Burma. However, the diverse positions that governments subscribe to create unnecessary complexity and difficulties in supporting change in Burma. In response to Black Friday and the ensuing crackdown on the democracy movement in Burma, the position of some governments may have shifted, strengthened, or remained unchanged. ASEAN Has not fulfilled their promise to `deal with Burma once it is in the family.' Prior to the pressure that has been placed on and by ASEAN after Black Friday, ASEAN continuously protected and defended the SPDC in the international arena, while suffering from the cross-border and regional problems coming from Burma. Australia Takes pride in their `non-Asian' and `non-Western' form of engagement with the SPDC. Prior to Black Friday they were increasing aid and human rights programs with the SPDC while withholding public criticism of the SPDC's abuses and decreasing cooperation with the opposition movement. Bangladesh Is focusing on increasing trade and cooperation with the SPDC. A sticking point is what to do with the nearly 20,000 Muslim refugees in Bangladesh that neither party wants. China SPDC's oldest and most important ally. At times China has encouraged the SPDC to make economic reforms and make more efforts on narcotics suppression. China conducts a lot of trade with Burma, supplies much of Burma's arms, protects Burma in international forums, and in return gets some benefits from Burma's strategic regional position. There is a large Chinese civilian and business presence in Burma, particularly in the north, Kachin State, Shan State, and Mandalay Division. However, in recent years, China has been irked by the flow of Burmese drugs and HIV/AIDS through its regions. EU Is a harsh critic of the SPDC and has imposed limited sanctions. However, several member countries, UK, Germany, the Netherlands, have sizeable trade and investment interests with Burma. Germany, Italy, and Austria are not in favor of increasing pressure on the regime with Germany Non-military options to support Burma's democratization threatening to veto such measures. Prior to Black Friday, EU countries were increasingly providing Burma with aid and more diplomatic contact, despite previous conditions listed in the October 2001 Common Position. [See EU's New Strategy April 2003 p172] They provide assistance to the prodemocracy movement. Acceding and cooperating countries support the Common Position. India Has recently begun embracing the SPDC for economic, border security, naval advantages and regional interests, which has included selling ammunition and weapons to the SPDC. Burma also plays a significant role in the India-China rivalry. The Indian government has moved away from its traditional position of solidarity with the pro-democracy movement. Japan Previously Japan practiced a form of `engagement', which did not
require specific action from the SPDC but provided the regime with
large amounts of aid and some verbal encouragement for political
and economic reforms. There were increasing amounts of visits from
current and former diplomats, who reportedly mentioned economic
and Malaysia Has been interested in assisting the SPDC to make economic reforms and at times is said to quietly suggest cooperation with the international community. Relations with the SPDC have deteriorated since August 2002. Dr. Mahathir's post-Black Friday comment sparked off discussion of the possibility of ejecting Burma from ASEAN. Russia Is quietly increasing their cooperation and influence with the SPDC. Russia appears to be a willing arms and loan supplier. S. Korea Has recently begun to substantially increase economic investments in and with Burma. Singapore Has been one of the largest investors in Burma, however in recent years there is a growing dissatisfaction with the insecurity of investments in Burma. At times has quietly encouraged the SPDC to make some economic reforms. A significant amount of trade from Malaysia and Bangladesh and some arms are transported via Singapore. Thailand Has taken a `pro-business' approach and often engages in `resource
diplomacy' in dealing with their troublesome neighbor and the Prime
Minister has `ordered a clear policy that the Thai government will
have nothing to do with Myanmar's internal affairs.'38 Thailand
is attempting to pacify the SPDC and the quiet border disputes by
U.S. Has the strongest sanctions and repeatedly condemns the actions
of the SPDC. Since Black Friday the U.S. has led efforts to encourage
ASEAN and regional countries to take a more involved position on
democratic reform in Burma. Prior to the new sanctions imparted
in July 2003, the U.S. was still quite economically involved with
Burma. --------------------------------------- CURRENT SANCTIONS CANADA'S SANCTIONS ON BURMA 1988 Suspension of bilateral & multilateral aid. Withdrew diplomatic
presence in Burma. 1997 Withdrew General Preferential Tariff eligibility on agricultural and industrial product. Placed Burma on Area Control List requiring all exports to Burma to have an export permit. 2003 Excluded from Least Developed Country (LDC) Market Access initiative, which eliminates most duties and quotas on imports from the other 48 LDCs. Reasserted the visa ban on senior regime officials. Placed travel restrictions on SPDC diplomats in Canada traveling outside Ottawa. EUROPEAN UNION SANCTIONS ON BURMA 1990 Arms embargo. 1991 Suspension of defense cooperation. Visa ban against top regime officials related to important governmental functions and their families. Expulsion of junta military personnel in Member States. High-level bilateral government visits to Burma suspended. Suspension of all non-humanitarian bilateral & multilateral aid 1996 Established a Common Position on Burma 1997 Generalized system of preference (GSP) eligibility withdrawn on agricultural and industrial products because of forced labor. 1998 Visa ban extended to prohibit entry and transit visas to senior SPDC officials and to extend the ban to include the tourism administration. 2000 Ban on export of equipment from EU that could be used for internal repression or terrorism. Published the list of 153 persons affected by the visa ban. Assets freeze on funds held abroad by those on visa ban list. 2002 List of `persons subject to restrictive measures' was updated. If there is no progress on `key issues of the national reconciliation process' the EU will Strengthen and broaden the assets freeze, travel ban measures, and arms embargo in October. June 2003 Extended the scope of the visa ban and assets freeze. Strengthened enforcement on elements of the arms embargo. Withdrawal of all military personnel of Member States in Burma and reiterate expulsion of SPDC military personnel in Member States. Suspension of non-humanitarian aid or development programs. JAPAN'S POLICY ON BURMA Aug 1988 Suspended aid disbursement, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and economic cooperation "until Burma attains liberty and democracy". Implemented an arms embargo. Feb 1989 Japan was the first country to officially recognize the regime. Disbursement of aid resumed on a case-by-case basis under existing agreements. No new aid programs. 1991 `Fundamental Principles of ODA' were created stipulating guidelines when considering ODA, including military spending, weapons procurement, democratic governance, market economy, economic and environmental issues. Nov 1994 Japan provided new humanitarian aid to Burma as a `reward' to the regime for the `political progress it had made…meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi.' 1995 Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially resumes aid to Burma in response to Daw Suu's release from house arrest. June 2003 Freeze on new bilateral economic aid to Burma. UNITED STATES SANCTIONS ON BURMA Sept 1988 Arms embargo and suspension of foreign assistance except humanitarian aid. 1989 Decertified Burma from being listed as cooperating in efforts against narcotics, denied anti-narcotics assistance and thus ineligible for Export-Import Bank and OPIC guarantees. Withdrew GSP eligibility. Adopted a policy of opposing multilateral aid and loans. 1990 Diplomatic representation downgraded to Charge d' Affaires. U.S. Customs and Trade Act of 1990 requires the imposition of economic sanctions on Burma if specific conditions on human rights and narcotics suppression are not met. July 1991 Denied renewal of bilateral textile agreement. Section 138 of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990. June 1993 Suspension of munitions export licenses to Burma under the Arms Export Control Act. April 1994 Burma placed on list of `outlaw' states, which mandates that voluntary U.S. funding for any UN agency be automatically reduced if the agency conducts programs in Burma. Sept 1996 U.S. assistance to Burma, except relief and anti-narcotics aid blocked under the FY 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. Oct 1996 Suspension of entry permission to the U.S. of persons who formulate, implement, or benefit from policies that are impeding the transition to democracy in Burma. May 1997 New U.S. investment in Burma by U.S. persons banned. Executive Order 13047. Suspension of non-humanitarian bilateral assistance. June 2000 Selective purchasing bill struck down in U.S. Supreme Court. July 2003 Import ban on any article that is a product of Burma. Assets freeze of SPDC institutions and senior members of the SPDC and USDA. Policy to oppose multilateral loans to Burma. Expanded visa ban on SPDC and USDA officials. Ban on remittances to Burma. ------------------------------------- SANCTIONS & THE ECONOMY Due to the largely `preventive' nature of current sanctions, prior
to July 2003, the actual impact sanctions have directly had on pre-existing
trade and investment was limited. However, the SPDC's trade policies
have managed to discourage business by persistent ad-hoc trade and
investment policies, widespread corruption, assets being seized
or frozen while in ventures with regime-backed agencies, having
no accountability and transparency, use of money laundering, and
an economic policy that is often created by `strategic, military
factors.'50 In 2002, the Heritage Foundation ranked Burma as one
of The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that activist campaigns dissuading investment in Burma, "have not done nearly as much damage as have the unpredictable, sometimes bizarre, policies of the junta itself." UN Special Envoy and businessman Razali Ismail said, "I can
assure you that if there is no clear steps towards national reconciliation
and political stability, even if there are no sanctions, investors
would be [reluctant] to go US Department of Commerce (2002) Burma
Country Commercial Guide FY200251 Heritage Foundation (Jan 02) 2002
Burma is not even eligible for loans from the World Bank and Asian Development Bank due in part to the failure to repay outstanding loans and partly because World Bank loans often have some conditions based on institutional and policy reforms. The Economist Intelligence Unit said, "Only an improvement in the political climate, heralding a rise in aid and investment inflows, will create the positive sentiment required to trigger a reversal of this weakening trend." The current economic situation (due to the regime's mismanagement and the deprivation of foreign capital and military supplies because of some sanctions) has slowed the growth of the military and its defense capabilities. This leaves the unanswered question of how strong the SPDC would be without these measures. The application of new sanctions will hurt the regime more than
the civilian population. Regime affiliated businesses dominate the
formal economy. Economist Alfred Oehlers argues that when taking
into account the `structural features of the Burmese economy as
well as key institutional features such as the pattern of ownership
and control' it may reasonably be presumed that `the negative consequences
arising from sanctions will have [the] greatest impact on the military
regime and its closest associates.' The majority of Burma's civilian
population is dependent upon the informal economy, The current economic situation has slowed the growth of the military and its defense capabilities. This leaves the unanswered question of how strong the SPDC would be without these measures. The regime is responsible for the severe deterioration of socioeconomic
development in Burma and for violating people's rights to their
own livelihood. A better system of governance is a basic requirement
for promoting sustainable economic reforms. If done
Only the U.S. and Canada have downgraded their diplomatic representation
in Burma in 1990 and 1988 respectively. The U.S. Embassy still operates
in Rangoon and the highest-ranking official is a Charge d' Affaires.
There is no Canadian Embassy in Burma, but the Canadian Ambassador
in Thailand is accredited to cover Burma. The EU MYTH 15: Burmese people do not want sanctions. REALITY 15: There is strong support for sanctions among the Burmese opposition groups. Many people in Burma believe a better economy is connected to better governance. On May 29, 2003 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said, "Economics and
politics are inseparable. A bad political system contributes to
a bad economic system."459 Sanctions can be an effective tool
to pressure the regime to commit to genuine reforms or at least
deny them resources to fund their barbaric rule. In refere nce to
the economic control of the In a survey of more than 200 Burmese workers, editors, journalists, and lawyers on the Thai-Burma border and in Rangoon, almost 80% want economic growth in Burma, but at the same time they don't want the sanctions to be lifted. The opposition movement is largely united behind the need for strong
international pressure, including the use of sanctions. In a strategy
meeting in 2001 of a broad spectrum of pro-democracy organizations,
including ethnic nationality groups, they called for the U.S., EU,
Canada and other countries to intensify national and regional In May 2003, a Shan spokesperson said, "although sanctions
may harm the people, they are suffering anyway. Sanctions, if applied
effectively, will strip the junta of its funds and force it to enter
dialogue." The Irrawaddy Magazine reported that, after the
enactment of July 2003 U.S. sanctions, "Kind words…came
from the most unlikely CONCLUSION The international community has learned the painful lesson that
a strategy hinged solely on diplomacy and inducements has only served
to encourage the Burmese regime to perpetuate a strategy of empty
promises. Experience has shown that the regime will only make an
effort to deliver actual reforms, albeit grudgingly, when faced
with The absence of effective sanctions would definitely empower the SPDC and confirm their singular hold on power. Gross human rights abuses would continue and likely increase, the genocide of ethnic nationalities would intensify, military weapons procurement would become easier, SPDC ad hoc economic policies would continue thus deterring foreign investment while Burma's refugee, narcotics, and HIV/AIDS problems would continue to penetrate into neighboring countries. Now, more than ever, there is no excuse not to take a strong stand on Burma. A broad international strategy, integrating a regimen of sanctions, is urgently needed to ensure that Burma is no longer trapped in the "one step forward, two steps backward" vicious cycle of the military junta. "I think we'll tell you when the military is genuine about political reform," ~ Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. "There should be no question whatever about our commitment
towards this process of national reconciliation. The reconciliation
process is very important. We are in the process of transition to
a democratic system because we want our country to be developed
and modernised.'' ~ Burma's Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win,
two Burma Campaign UK (17 Jun 02) Interview with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Bangkok Post (24 Mar 03) Junta Looks in No Hurry in Talks with Suu Kyi: Larry Jagan ********************************************************************** A L T E R N A T I V E A S E A N N E T W O R K O N
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