Crisis, at the International Crisis Group

                                                                                       Kanbawza Win

            The other day as we were coming out from Church in Brussels, the heart of Europe, I was introduce to a person who is working with the International Crisis Group. I convey him the message that I would like to pay a courtesy call to their infamous office and perhaps exchange views on Burma. I email to him several times but he never cared to reply. This was soon after the release of their notorious paper “Myanmar Military and the Future”.

            Reading their paper, I clearly recollect my younger days when Burmese history books by G. E. Harvey, D.G.E. Hall and so forth written from the colonial vantage were the order of the day. Lamentably, the so-called Burma experts or foreign scholars lack not only in-depth understanding of the Burmese affairs, but also responsibility and professionalism. Regrettably, these so called Burma experts and scholars, who take to the podium and talk in academic absurdities on Burma has a great negative effect on the people of Burma who are struggle for democracy and self determination and also for the donors who got confused and could not make their decisions clearly or make a wrong decisions. Hence even if their talk is cheap the consequences and implications are very costly to the entire struggling lot.

            It is really painful to witness that the ICG hired "foreign experts" (which according to the Burmese Junta’s terminology is a hooked nose farang) who in fact had a very limited understanding of Burma, were handsomely paid to write their reports. In the end, the ICG report failed to acknowledge current political problems and called for "immediate and direct international attention". The ICG called for humanitarian aid for the Junta’s Burma, despite the plea for sanctions and isolation by most Burmese analysts including the Burmese Peace Nobel laureate and democratic leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The latest ICG report on Burma’s Tatmadaw (armed forces) again written by foreigners was simplistic and failed to add anything new. It further proved that some scholars knew very little about military-ruled Burma. If scholars ignore the real situation in Burma and continue to protect their own interests, Burmese studies will never be worthwhile for people in Burma and those who have a real goodwill (cetana) to the people of Burma.

With more native Burmese minds contributing to research, perspectives are sure to be more realistic. There is no reason why Burmese people should not be at the forefront of Burmese studies. Native Burmese scholars should be encouraged to study their own country. At the same time, academic institutions around the world need to be more accessible to Burmese scholars. Now it is found that the work of farang scholars is not only unscholarly, but is morally bankrupt if not naive.

            A few international conferences provided opportunity for lively intellectual exchange, however, what was most disappointing were the lack of Burmese among the "Burma experts". Obviously with intellectual freedom so tightly suppressed, it is difficult for scholars inside Burma to make a contribution. They are not allowed to make a research on sensitive issues like politics and economics. Besides the Junta is so bankrupt that it could not afford an air ticket to these Burmese scholars, even if they do the Generals are afraid that they would be contaminated with the Burmese Scholars in Diaspora struggling to free the country. So it is impossible for an inside Burmese scholars are able to offer ideas of their own. But there are several Burmese scholars in Diaspora, and not all of them are invited. Why?

If we were to look at the ICG paper Tatmadaw the very first glance would indicated its jaundiced eyes with a very lop-sided one. Many Burmese in Diaspora think that ICGt has some sort of relations with the Junta because it echoes, eulogize the Junta with the goal of legitimizing and approving, the Junta’s justification for staying in power. It lauded the Junta’s claims of success in expanding and modernizing the armed forces forgetting that there was no external threat. The ICG scholars could not read the hand writings on the wall that the Burmese army is suppressing the pro democracy movement with numerous arrest and is use in ethnic cleansing, the proof of which are so abundant.

           The most troubling aspects are that it forgets Burmese history. The only time that the Burmese army was challenged was in the 1970s to about the mid-1980s when under the banner of the Communist Party of Burma aided amply not only with military hardware from the Chinese (on a party-to-party basis), but by Chinese PLA volunteers as well to together with the Wa ethnic tribe traded bullet for bullet, shell for shell. The other ethnic groups like the Shan, Kachin, and Mon stay aside while the Chin are the ones that actually fought on the Tamadaw side. This clearly indicates the political maturity of the ethnic nationalities. Why this fact is not stated? 
           However, if the ICG scholars did not admire the expanding of the Burmese Tatmadaw why does it do not mentioned over 700,000 child soldiers serving in the frontlines? How about a new weapon of war in terms of systematic rapes on the ethnic women? If they are really unbiased scholars why are they not mention?

But, credit should be duly given to the ICG paper when it surprisingly states that many soldiers probably lack commitment to the military government’s ideology. It also says, albeit between the lines, that the latest restructuring of the military of its command apparatus seems more like moves to make room for former regional commanders, rather than real restructuring. This is an astute observation because the military’s command-and-control structure is bloated and overlaps. For example, in addition to regional commands, there are tactical commands, plus division commands, which are more or less autonomous, and there have been established bureaus for Special Operations. Why overlook these facts?
            The paper then proceeds to discuss the NLD’s vision of the future armed forces as outlined by the CRPP (Committee Representing People’s Parliament) and conclude that “it is not too different from that of the military hierarchy and that the NLD is ready to compromise and to also recognize the special role the military played in Burma’s history and society”. But the Tatmadaw show no signs of relinquishing power and has consistently refused to reveal any accurate information about the military’s organization, force structure, order of battle or combat capabilities, annual expenditure and arms acquisitions. The Generals have dismissed the NLD’s defense policy position, viewing it as of little worth and as having no legitimacy. Why was this not mentioned?

The ICG paper offers some lame suggestions with regard to the future status of the armed forces such as permitting in administrative duties, in national reconstruction and development, war on drugs, and other political and civilian spheres which amounts to inviting it to intrude into or intervene in politics. How in a democratic state can such things be allowed? As will be recalled, military coups in Latin America and other third world countries, including Burma has its roots in the dependence of the state or rather the power-holders. Besides the war on drugs is that the petty commanders themselves are very much involved in it with the Generals turning a blind eye. Simple logic is missing when suggesting that a fox should look after the sheep.
            The paper urges the international community to “abandon the kind of thinking that sees any progress achieved under the military government as an obstacle to democratization and therefore something to be neither supported nor encouraged or even acknowledged.” This hypothesis is ridiculous because anything positive the Junta achieves it claims to its legitimacy. This is the main reason of why the international community treats the Junta as it is. Is the ICG afraid to call “a spade a spade.”

 Although the ICG paper maintains that the military’s mind-set is monopolistic and narrow, and that it regards any discussion of defense and security as a direct challenge to itself, the paper assumes that an “atmosphere of progress” presumably induced by an “enabling international environments” – that is, the “carrots only” approach – will do the trick 

The paper is on the whole a fair one, which in Burmese we say, Hin Lay Oo Hte Mha Ma Sin Ta Zun Kya Thwa Dae, if directly translated would be something like a spoonful of excreta has fallen into the pot of delicious curry, astute in parts and critical of the military top brass, its conviction that the regime is impervious to international pressure, and that it will respond positively to the “carrots only” approach is troubling and reveals a very naive mind-set with regard to the politics of authoritarianism and despotism.

It is high time for more Burmese insights, and for more responsibility in scholarship. Even though it is true that the Burmese people on the whole cannot solved their own problem these so called foreign Burma experts should not harbor a grandiose and neo colonist attitude (such as the White Man’s Burden) of not differentiating the Generals as the Burmese people and lump them together as “half man and half beast.”

If we were ever allowed to think it aloud we were wondering, whether the ICG would be more beneficial, at least to Burma, if it would ever hired less foreign Burma experts and use that expense to organize a conference similar to Goteborg conference is Sweden and give the travelling expenses to the native Burmese scholars (such as Drs Chao Tzang, Zarni, Prof. Khin Mg Kyi, Mya Than, Tin Mg Mg Than and scores who are in Diaspora) to teach these so called hook nose Burma experts, the lessons of Burmese history and the aspirations of the people. The very least is that it will put an eye drop in their cocked eyes. At least they must know how to differentiate the two Burmese words of Tatmadaw and Thatmadaw. Similar, but entirely different meaning and lamentably the ICG have chosen a wrong one.

Prof. Kanbawza Win is a Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute of Asian Studies based in Brussels.

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